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Petitioner
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-2(a).

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has authority to review the Workforce Appeals Board
decision pursuant to Utah Ann § 78-2(a)-2(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Did Fresenius Medical Care present competent evidence that they had just
cause for discharging the claimant. This issue was preserved for review in the
proceedings below at R. 50.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a), which
provides:
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for the purpose of establishing a waiting
period:

(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause...
1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the issue of whether Mr. Golchin was terminated by
Fresenius Health Care for just cause. The Department of Workforce Services
Determined that he was and denied him unemployment benefits. The Workforce
Services Appeals Board upheld this decision. Mr. Golchin contends that Fresenius
presented no competent evidence to support the conclusion that he was terminated for
just cause. The relevant facts are as follows:
FACTS
1. Mr. Golchin was an employee of Fresenius Health Medical Care beginning
on September 23, 2002. (R 73)
2. He suffered a work related injury to his back on December 25, 2002. ( R
46)
3. His doctor restricted him to light duty work as of December 31, 2002. (R
47)
4. His employer found out about his light duty work restriction on March 25,
2003.

(76) .
5. His regular rate of pay was $9.68 per hour. ( 73).
6. Occasionally, Mr. Golchin was authorized by his supervisor to clock in as

an alternate at a rate of pay of $12.20 per hour. ( 74)
7. On March 25, the same day Fresenius found out that the appellant had been

released to light duty, they also claimed they had discovered that Mr. Golchin had
clocked in as an alternate without authorization on January 2, 2003; January 12, 2003;
January 13, 2003; February 24, 2003; February 25, 2003; March 3, 2003; March 4,
2003; March 5, 2003; March 7, 2003; March 9, 2003; March 20, 2003 and March 21,
2003; ( 74, 75, 76, 87 and 88.)
8. They had never reviewed his time cards previously. (91).
9. They only reviewed the appellant's time cards. ( 90).
10. The respondents keep no written records of when the supervisor authorized
a person to clock in as an alternate. (81).
11. John Summers was Mr. Golchin's supervisor. ( 85 and 86).
12. Summers can't remember which days he gave Mr. Golchin permission to
clock in as an alternate. (86).
13. Summers claims he could only recall for certain that he did not authorize
Mr. Golchin to clock in as an alternate on March 20 and March 21, 2003. ( 87 and 88).
14. However, Summers did not Work on March 20 and 21, 2003. (® 119).
15. The supervisor on those days was Vince Gonzales. (120).
16. Mr. Golchin testified that he was authorized to clock in as an alternate on
those days. (109).

3.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Golchin was terminated for clocking in as an alternate when he was not
authorized to do so. However, Fresenius presented no competent evidence that Mr.
Golchin was not authorized to clock in as and alternate. The circumstances show that
clocking in as an alternate without authorization was just a pretext for firing him
because he had suffered a work related injury.

ARGUMENT
In order to deny unemployment benefits, the employer must show that it had
just cause for discharging the employee. U.C.A.§ 35A-4-40592)(a). In this case, the
employer claims that the Appellant was terminated for clocking in as an alternate
without authorization. However, the employer could produce no credible evidence
that the Appellant ever clocked in as an alternate without authorization from his
supervisor.
Fresenius kept no records of the days an employee was authorized to clock in
as an alternate. Thus they have no specific documentation by which they can go back
and determine whether, on a particular day, the Petitioner was authorized to clock in
as an alternate. The Petitioner's supervisor, John Summers, testified that he gave the
Petitioner permission to clock in as an alternate at different times, but cannot
remember the dates. The only dates he claims he recalls for certain that he did not
4.

give the Petitioner permission to clock in as an alternate were March 20th and 21 st .
Thus, the testimony comes down to two days that Fresenius claims the Petitioner was
not authorized to clock in as an alternate. However, Summers testified that he did not
work those two days. The supervisor on those days was Vince Gonzales. However,
Mr Gonzales was not called to testify. Hence the only person who testified with
personal knowledge regarding whether he had permission was the Petitioner himself.
He testified that he was authorized to clock in as an alternate.
Interestingly, the issue of whether Mr. Golchin had clocked in properly never
arose until his supervisors at Fresenius found out that he suffered a work related injury
and had been placed on light duty. At that time, they initiated an extensive review of
his time records. They had never reviewed his time records before. Furthermore, they
did not review anyone else's time records either. This appears to have been the only
systematic review of an employee's time records that Fresenius had ever undertaken
up to that time. Hence, it appears to have been conducted as a pretext to terminate Mr.
Golchin because of his work related injury.

CONCLUSION
The issue in this case is whether the petitioner had permission to clock in as
alternate on those days when he did so. The Scott Summer's, Mr. Golchin's
supervisor, testified that he could not recall any days except March 20 and 21st.
5.

However, he also testified that he did not work those day and so would not have any
personal knowledge of whether the Mr. Golchin had permission to clock in as an
alternate or not. The reason Fresenius gives for firing Mr. Golchin appears to have
been a pretext to disguise the fact that they were really firing him because of his work
related injury. Because of this, Fresenius did not have just cause to fire Mr. Golchin
and therefore, he is entitled to keep his unemployment benefits.

DATED this

I

day of June, 2004

6.

ADDENDUM

104

UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE

An individual in training with the approval of the
on is not ineligible to receive benefits by reason of
l i a b i l i t y for work, failure to search for work, reof suitable work, failure to apply for or to accept
>le work, or not having been unemployed for a
ig period of one week with respect to any week the
dual is in the approved training. For purposes of
Subsection (2Xa), the division shall approve any
atory apprenticeship-related training.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapo otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benbr any week:
(i) because the individual is in training approved
nder Section 236(aXD of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
LS.C. 2296(a);
(ii) for leaving work to enter training described in
ubsection (2XbXi) if the work left is not suitable
mployment; or
(iii) because of the application to any such week in
aining of provisions in this law or any applicable
deral unemployment compensation law relating to
l i a b i l i t y for work, active search for work, or reisal to accept work.
For purposes of this Subsection (2), "suitable eme n f means work of a substantially equal or higher
evel t h a n the individual's past adversely affected
yment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of
and wages for t h a t work at not less t h a n 80% of the
foal's average weekly wage as determined for the
ses of t h e Trade Act of 1974.
department may, by rule, waive or alter either or
3 requirements of Subsections (lXa) and (b) as to
j attached to regular jobs and as to other types of
tuations with respect to which it finds t h a t complithe requirements would be oppressive, or would be
it with the purposes of this chapter as long as the
t conflict with Subsection 35A-4-40K1).
1999
• Eligibility for benefits after r e c e i v i n g workers' c o m p e n s a t i o n or o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e
compensation.
rithstanding any requirements involving base perir benefit compensational factors provided for under
»r a person who has had a continuous period of
• injury for which he was compensated under the
mpensation or the occupational disease laws of this
ider federal law shall, if he is otherwise eligible,
be entitled to receive the unemployment compenifits he would have been entitled to receive under
I regulations based on his potential eligibility at the
last employment.
fit rights shall not be preserved under this section
individual:
iles a claim for benefits with respect to a week no
lan 90 days after the end of the continuous period
jess or injury; and
Jes the claim with respect to a week within the
ith period immediately following the commencef such period of sickness or injury.
1996
Ineligibility for benefits.
idual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of
* a waiting period:
i) For the week in which the claimant left work
untarily without good cause, if so found by the
ision, and for each week thereafter until the claimt has performed services in bona fide, covered
ployment and earned wages for those services
ial to at least six times the claimant's weekly
lefit amount.

574

(b) A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
(c) Using available information from employers
and the claimant, the division shall consider for the
purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to
the labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to
equity and good conscience.
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this
section, a claimant who h a s left work voluntarily to
accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or
in a new locality does so without good cause for
purposes of Subsection (1).
(2) (a) For the week in which t h e claimant was discharged for j u s t cause or for an act or omission in
connection with employment, not constituting a
crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and
adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found
by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has
earned an amount equal to a t least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.
(b) For the week in which h e was discharged for
dishonesty constituting a crime or any felony or class
A misdemeanor in connection with his work as shown
by the facts, together with his admission, or as shown
by his conviction of t h a t crime in a court of competent
jurisdiction and for t h e 51 next following weeks.
Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base
period, and are not available for this or any subsequent claim for benefits.
(3) (a) I f t h e division finds t h a t t h e claimant has failed
without good cause to properly apply for available
suitable work, to accept a referral to suitable work
offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable
work offered by an employer or the employment
office. The ineligibility continues until the claimant
has performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for t h e services in an amount
equal to a t least six times t h e claimant's weekly
benefit amount.
(b) (i) A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for
benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or
accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a n a t u r e t h a t it would be contrary
to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
(ii) The division shall consider t h e purposes of
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary
to equity and good conscience.
(c) In determining whether or not work is suitable
for an individual, the division shall consider the:
(i) degree of risk involved to his health, safety!
and morals;
(ii) individual's physical fitness and prior
training;
(iii) individual's prior earnings and experience;
(iv) individual's length of unemployment;
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